Breakdown of Fed Lending in the 2008 Crisis

Lending
Etienne Girardet on Unsplash

A good place to start to understand the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) response to the present crisis, its unprecedented lending, is by really understanding its response to the last one, which had been unprecedented until now. Before we are able to fully analyze the Fed’s response to the present crisis, which is still evolving and ongoing, the press or public will likely need to pursue Freedom of Information Act lawsuits for release of detailed information, as Bloomberg had to do the last time. Regarding the last crisis, the most extensive analysis of the Fed’s various lending programs was done by Felkerson (2011). Therefore, this series of posts will start there, by summarizing and explaining his analysis.

As many market participants and others know, the Fed manages the federal funds rate. This is the “standard tool” (targeting the rate, not the money supply) that the Fed uses to manage the economy. The fed funds market is an uncollateralized market in which depository institutions and government sponsored enterprises lend to each other overnight. The Fed participates in this market via its primary dealers until the effective fed funds rate falls in line with the Fed’s target rate.

Also, the Fed directly sets the discount window rates and terms (duration, haircut (overcollateralization), and collateral), which is available to commercial banks and other depository institutions. These are the key rates, and they went from approximately 5+% to 0% from August 2007 to December 2008. (It is important to keep in mind that the duration and other lending terms are key features of these arrangements.)

After hitting the zero-lower bound (in terms of short-term interest rates), the Fed engaged in quantitative easing, as explained here. Regarding the Fed’s balance sheet, the assets are publicly available here, and the corresponding increases are captured on the liabilities side as reserves (or excess reserves, with interest on excess reserves (IOER) starting in October 2008).

Fed Lending Starts – General

In addition to the reduction in these short-term interest rates (as well as IOER and elaborate forward guidance), the Fed created several special facilities. As Felkerson says, “The authorization of many of these unconventional measures would require the use of what was, until the recent crisis, an ostensibly archaic section of the Federal Reserve Act—Section 13(3), which gave the Fed the authority ‘under unusual and exigent circumstances’ to extend credit to individuals, partnerships, and corporations.” This point will become even more salient when we shift to the present period.     

One of the distinguishing aspects of Felkerson’s methodology is the following: “To provide an account of the magnitude of the Fed’s bailout, we argue that each unconventional transaction by the Fed represents an instance in which private markets were incapable or unwilling to conduct normal intermediation and liquidity provisioning activities…. Thus, to report the magnitude of the bailout, we have calculated cumulative totals by summing each transaction conducted by the Fed.”

“Each transaction” are the critical words. When each transaction is counted, the total lending would be considerably higher than a methodology that counts each contract, for example, repo contract since they are often rolled over, only once, depending on how each transaction is defined.

Now, the alphabet soup of lending facilities as ordered and explained by Felkerson:

  • Term Auction Facility (TAF) – rate determined by auction, 28-day or 84-day term. Lending to depository institutions so that they could avoid the stigma associated with using the discount window, also acceptance of a wider range of collateral. Felkerson summarizes, “The TAF ran from December 20, 2007 to March 11, 2010…. A total of 416 unique [foreign and domestic] banks borrowed from this facility…. The Fed loaned $3,818 billion in total over the run of this program.”
  • Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines (CBLS) – “The facility ran from December 2007 to February 2010 and issued a total of 569 loans…. In total, the Fed lent $10,057.4 billion to foreign central banks over the course of this program as of September 28, 2011.” His percentages calculated for each central bank were: ECB 80%, BoE 9%, SNB 4%, BoJ 4%, All Others 3%.
  • Series of term repurchase transactions (ST OMO) – “28-day repo contracts in which primary dealers posted collateral eligible under conventional open market operations…. In 375 transactions, the Fed lent a total of $855 billion dollars.”
  • Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) – 18 primary dealers participated. Lending totaled “$1,940 billion.”  
  • TSLF Options Program (TOP) – 11 primary dealers participated. Lending totaled “$62.3 billion.”

Fed Lending Continued – Bear Stearns Specific

Two of Bear Stearns’ hedge funds had considerable exposure to subprime mortgages, and this led to the whole firm experiencing liquidity problems. Specifically, regardless of the quality of its collateral or the relative concentration of the troubled assets to one part of its business, the firm was shut out of the tri-party repo market, on which it depended for liquidity to operate its business.

As Felkerson writes, in response, “on March 13…[it informed the Fed] that it would most likely have to file for bankruptcy the following day should it not receive an emergency loan. In an attempt to find an alternative to the outright failure of Bear, negotiations began between representatives from the Fed, Bear Stearns, and J.P. Morgan. The outcome of these negotiations was announced on March 14, 2008 when the Fed Board of Governors voted to authorize the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) to provide a $12.9 billion loan to Bear Stearns through J.P. Morgan Chase against collateral consisting of $13.8 billion.”

To facilitate the actual sale to Bear Stearns, the Fed created a special purpose vehicle (SPV) called Maiden Lane I. As Felkerson explains, “Maiden Lane, LLC would repay its creditors, first the Fed [$28.82 billion] and then J.P. Morgan [$1.15 billion], the principal owed plus interest over ten years at the primary credit rate [one of the discount window rates] beginning in September 2010. The structure of the bridge loan and ML I represent one-time extensions of credit. As onetime extensions of credit, the peak outstanding occurred at issuance of the loans.”

On March 16, 2008, the same day that JPMorgan Chase issued its provisional merger with Bear Stearns, the Fed set up the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). This facility was meant to prevent these investment banks (banks that were not eligible to go to the discount window for assistance) from experiencing liquidity issues, which could quickly become solvency issues.

I use the word “prevent,” because theoretically, that is the idea with any backstop, including FDIC deposit insurance. Its creation is meant to instill confidence, and banks only avail themselves of the facility when its mere existence is not enough to prevent a run. (All of these liquidity issues can be characterized as runs.) However, just as with the discount window, the use of these facilities can come with stigma, with investors and market participants questioning the general viability of the firm when it resorts to using the lending facility.   

Felkerson summarizes the PDCF as follows: “Initial collateral accepted in transactions under the PDCF were investment grade securities. Following the events in September of that year, eligible collateral was extended to include all forms of securities normally used in private sector repo transactions…. The PDCF issued 1,376 loans totaling $8,950.99 billion…. [T]he five largest borrowers account for 85 percent ($7,610 billion) of the total. Eight foreign primary dealers would participate in the PDCF, borrowing just six percent of the total. The PDCF was closed on February 1, 2010.”

Fed Lending Continued – AIG Specific

In the wake of Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, to prevent AIG from failing, the Fed first created a revolving credit facility (RCF), “on September 16, 2008, which carried an $85 billion credit line; the RCF lent $140.316 billion to AIG in total,” and the Fed created a secure borrowing facility (SBF) to facilitate repo transactions; “[c]umulatively, the SBF lent $802.316 billion in direct credit in the form of repos against AIG collateral” (Felkerson).

Then Maiden Lane II “was created with a $19.5 billion loan from the FRBNY to purchase residential MBS from AIG’s securities lending portfolio,” and these proceeds were used to pay off SBF (Felkerson).

The Fed later created Maiden Lane III to “address the greatest threat to AIG’s restructuring—losses associated with the sizeable book of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) on which it had written credit default swaps (CDS)…, [which] was funded by a FRBNY loan to purchase AIG’s CDO portfolio, [totaling] $24.3 billion” in lending (Felkerson). 

Then, “on December 1, 2009…FRBNY received preferred interests in two SPVs created to hold the outstanding common stock of AIG’s largest foreign insurance subsidiaries [AIA/ALICO transactions]… On September 30, 2010 an agreement was reached between the AIG, the Fed, the U.S. Treasury, and the SPV trustees…. [They] announced the closing of the recapitalization plan…, and all monies owed to the RCF were repaid in full January 2011” (Felkerson).

Let us pause at this point and consider that the United States central bank, whose dual mandate is price stability and full employment, and which is really not supposed to be buying anything but government-issued or, at best, government-backed (Agency MBS) securities, was purchasing CDOs of uncertain value, considerable opacity and high risk to help one corporation, AIG, which had become greedy and irresponsible. The total lending ($140 + $802 + $20 + $24 + $25) was over $1 trillion dollars. It is worth repeating. AIG got over $1 trillion in aid from the Fed while regular Americans often lost their homes, lost their jobs, went bankrupt or were plunged into poverty.

Fed Lending – The Alphabet Soup Continued

However, this was not the end of the Fed’s lending to help private industry, literally entire industries. Within the money market mutual fund (MMF) industry, the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck on September 16, 2008. It not only held Lehman’s commercial paper but had actually increased its exposure to the firm prior to its bankruptcy.

This event triggered a run on the entire industry, which was over $2 trillion at the time. (Institution investors generally treat money market funds like depository institutions, that is, they seek capital preservation not returns.) The redemptions triggered a downward spiral in asset prices as the funds were forced to sell assets to meet them.

AMLF

The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) was created on September 19, 2008 to facilitate nonrecourse loans to MMFs at the primary credit rate. “Two institutions, J.P. Morgan Chase and State Street Bank and Trust Company, constituted 92 percent of AMLF intermediary borrowing…. Over the course of the program, the Fed would lend a total of $217.435 billion…. The AMLF was closed on February 1, 2010” (Felkerson).

CPFF

The mutual fund industry’s distress resulted in a flight to safety, which had an adverse effect on the commercial paper market. With companies issuing commercial paper unable to find enough buyers, the commercial paper market froze. “To address this disruption, the Fed announced the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) on October 7, 2008. [The SPV purchased] highly rated ABCP and unsecured U.S. dollar-denominated CP of three-month maturity from eligible issuers…. The cumulative total lent under the CPFF was $737.07 billion…. The CPFF was suspended on February 1, 2010” (Felkerson).

Note that even “highly rated ABCP” are still opaque instruments, and conservative institutional investors assess the risk of the instrument typically by the issuing bank not the underlying collateral.

TALF

These liquidity provisions were still unable to stabilize financial markets, which had transitioned to an originate-and-distribute model, and “the Fed announced the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) on November 25, 2008. Operating similarly to the AMLF, the Fed provided nonrecourse loans to eligible borrowers posting eligible collateral, but for terms of five years. Borrowers then would act as an intermediary, using the TALF loans to purchase ABS [Asset Backed Securities]…. Although the Fed terminated lending under the TALF on June 30, 2010, loans remain outstanding under the program until March 30, 2015. The Fed loaned in total $71.09 billion” (Felkerson).

Summary of Fed Lending in 2008

Felkerson summarizes all the Fed’s lending programs as follows and provides the figure below: “When all individual transactions are summed across all unconventional LOLR [lender of last resort] facilities, the Fed spent a total of $29,616.4 billion dollars! Note this includes direct lending plus asset purchases…. Three facilities—CBLS, PDCF, and TAF—would overshadow all other unconventional LOLR programs, and make up 71.1 percent ($22,826.8 billion) of all assistance.”

Note that MBS data can be found on the SOMA site. (Felkerson separated them from the traditional Treasury securities that are a standard part of open market operations.) Felkerson notes that “[i]f the CBLS [central bank liquidity swaps] are excluded, 83.9 percent ($16.41 trillion) of all assistance would be provided to only 14 [of the largest financial] institutions [in the world]…. [And] the six largest foreign-based institutions would receive 36 percent ($10.66 trillion) of the total bailout.”

As calculated by Felkerson, the Fed’s lending programs in response to the 2008 financial crisis was massive, double the nominal GDP at the time; the institutions directly benefiting were relatively few, and the risks were high. The legal justification for what was at the time unprecedented actions was flimsy, the Federal Reserve Act—Section 13(3), if not illegal.

What was the reward for the American people, whose lives and tax dollars were ultimately at stake, for all of this Federal Reserve support for a financial system that had grown too large, too corrupt and too greedy? What did you get from the Fed’s astronomical amounts of lending? You got a system that learned how to exploit the existing order and you, the American people. The Federal Reserve has become captive to these financial players and markets, and you, the American people, are its victims.

Lehman’s Lasting Legacy on the Federal Reserve

Lehman
Photo: David Shankbone / CC BY-SA (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/). Image has been modified.

It has been only a little over a decade yet it feels like a century ago perhaps because it also feels like the latest iteration of the Gilded Age. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. In (this summary of) his paper, Laurence Ball (2016) asks, “Why did the Federal Reserve [Fed] let Lehman Brothers fail?” He follows with, “Fed officials say they lacked the legal authority to rescue the firm, because it did not have adequate collateral to borrow the cash it needed.” He (p2) writes, “According to Bernanke (FCIC testimony, 2010): ‘[T]he only way we could have saved Lehman would have been by breaking the law, and I’m not sure I’m willing to accept those consequences for the Federal Reserve and for our systems of laws. I just don’t think that would be appropriate.’”

Ball (p2) disputes the Fed’s official line and Bernanke’s explanation. Instead, Ball concludes “that the explanation offered by Fed officials is incorrect, in two senses: a perceived lack of legal authority was not the reason for the Fed’s inaction; and the Fed did in fact have the authority to rescue Lehman.” He argues that, based on a de novo examination of its finances, Lehman did have enough collateral and that the Fed prevented it from using the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).

The sensitivity around this question is that Lehman’s failure was a cataclysmic event for financial markets and for the global economy. If the Fed had allowed it to fail on dubious grounds, it would reflect a gross error in judgment and even incompetence. Ball (p3) states, “The record also shows that the decision to let Lehman fail was made primarily by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson,” even though this is the Fed’s purview not the Treasury’s, and the decision was made presumably considering political sensitivities. (You might also recall that Paulson was the former chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs, a competing investment bank, and if there were any ulterior motives, that would have been corruption.)

Therefore, the primary questions are: Why did the Fed not rescue Lehman? Did it have the legal authority to do so? Did Lehman have adequate collateral available? Were there political or other reasons for the decision?

The Complexities  

In fairness to the Fed, it can get sued, and it has. Most notably, it got sued by former AIG CEO Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, who after a fair amount of drama lost his case with the court ruling that he did not have legal standing to pursue it. Instead, AIG did, and it had declined to do so. (In case you are interested in listening to Greenberg’s side of the story.) The prior ruling, in June 2015, had ruled in Greenberg’s favor but awarded no damages, and as Moyer (2017) reports the court stated that “the Federal Reserve had overstepped its authority in taking the stake in A.I.G.”

Thus, if the Fed indeed had legal concerns, the ensuing events would suggest that they were reasonable and legitimate. Also, in the United States, rehypothecation of collateral (repledging) is limited by Rule 15c3-3 of the SEC, but the United Kingdom had no such restriction. Lehman’s bailout would have included its foreign subsidiaries including its UK-based broker dealer. Thus, in terms of the counterfactual, had collateral been posted, it is uncertain who or which institution would have had final claim to it: other holders of the collateral or the Fed.

This potential concern for the Fed seems supported by Ball’s (p5) description of its actions, “The entity that Barclays almost purchased on the 14th, and which famously filed for bankruptcy on the 15th, was Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI), a corporation with many subsidiary companies. Most of these subsidiaries also entered bankruptcy immediately, but one did not: Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), which was Lehman’s broker-dealer in New York. The Fed kept LBI in business from September 15 to September 18 by lending it tens of billions of dollars through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility; after that, Barclays purchased part of LBI and the rest was wound down.” Also, LBI was heavily involved in the repo market, with its book still relatively intact perhaps due to access to the PDCF, and LBI’s disorderly unwinding might have been detrimental to the important money market.

Prior to Lehman’s failure, the Fed managed the sale of Bear Stearns, another failed investment bank, to JPMorgan Chase. The Fed subsequently set up the PDCF. (Another question that remains perhaps even more of a mystery is why Lehman did not avail itself of the PDCF earlier when its insolvency would not have been in question.) The Fed’s intervention in AIG involved a considerable equity stake, as the corporation was effectively nationalized. Thus, these two outcomes, managed sale and nationalization were not bailouts in the sense of what was to come.

Lehman – The Lesson Learned

Lehman’s bankruptcy triggered a credit crunch, and the Fed’s reaction was an alphabet soup of “special facilities,” including ones for the money market mutual fund industry, which experienced a run, and commercial paper, which froze. The Fed effectively backstopped trillion-dollar industries and provided trillions of dollars in additional support to various institutions. The knee-jerk reaction suggests that the Fed and others underestimated the impact of Lehman’s failure, and in its aftermath, decided to dramatically reverse course to a “whatever-it-takes” approach.

Lehman – The Lesson to Unlearn

The last lesson needs to be unlearned. As it turns out, what we have really learned is that moral hazard is a serious concern that has not been adequately considered or appreciated. The correct approach is to either allow firms to file bankruptcy or truly nationalize them. The focus of bailouts should be people not corporations. The American people’s tax dollars are not a piggy bank for irresponsible corporations. They are its collective contribution to build a better society for themselves.

Dramatically reversing course from what was once a more free-market ideology to a bastardized version of Keynesian economics takes the American economy and people from one extreme to another. This legacy of Lehman’s downfall is rearing its ugly head as the Fed bails out entire industries and corporations with no restraint and no accountability during this present crisis. It was irresponsible and immoral then, and it still is now. The American people deserve better.

Related to this post

Avarice and the Dying of the American Experiment

American Experiment
Photo: Razvan Chisu on Unsplash

Americans should rage against the dying of the light that once shone from our shores as a beacon of a free and self-governing society to the world. We once held the promise of opportunity and were a source of inspiration and hope to people around the world yearning for liberty, justice and equality. Presently, we inch ever closer to becoming a failed state. At our founding, the greatest threat was a foreign one. Now, as it was for many great empires, it is a domestic one. The primary source of this internal threat is a sin as old as time – greed, which then drives corruption.

We have all heard the statistics about the growing inequality and the crony capitalism that is choking meritocracy and entrepreneurialism. It suffocates our citizens in debt and crushes their quality of life, as they run faster and faster only to move backward. This latest trend began about a half century ago. As Mishel and Wolfe (2019) stated, “From 1978 to 2018, CEO compensation grew by 1,007.5% (940.3% under the options-realized measure), far outstripping S&P stock market growth (706.7%) and the wage growth of very high earners (339.2%). In contrast, wages for the typical worker grew by just 11.9%.” And Saez and Zucman (2014) wrote, “The share of wealth held by the top 0.1 percent of families is now almost as high as in the late 1920s, when ‘The Great Gatsby’ defined an era that rested on the inherited fortunes of the robber barons of the Gilded Age.”

Under the free market capitalism model, a company’s board of directors is supposed to act as a check on irresponsible executive behavior. Instead, the boards of many companies effectively abdicate their duties and allow the executives to lavish themselves at the expense of the long-term interests of their companies. In more recent years, this is particularly evident in the stock buybacks, which have driven share prices, enriching the executives and, as usual, leaving behind the workers, who are the lifeblood of the company. (See Useem, 2019)

The callousness of the rich is particularly apparent at this precarious moment when the nation is facing a pandemic on top of the long-standing and exacerbating structural problems. Instead of putting the country’s interests first, the corporate cronies have been lobbying the GOP for a slush fund. It is not enough to undercompensate the American people for their hard work or to deprive them of secure, well-paying jobs, these parasitic corporations are now trying to siphon the American taxpayers’ money into their own pockets. As these greedy individuals and corporations continue to put their interests above the American people’s and the country’s, the country drifts further and further to plutocracy. (Also see the film series “Plutocracy,” Noble, 2019.)

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